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Abstract
When agricultural productivity improves, farmers may react by expanding farming and
further encroach on forest lands, or they may choose to intensify and produce more output with less land. We specify the conditions under which agricultural productivity can
have such ambiguous effects on deforestation. We then examine the predictions of that
model using county-level data from five waves of the Brazilian Census of Agriculture
and satellite-based measures of land use. We identify productivity shocks using exogenous variation in rural electrification in Brazil during 1960-2000. We show that locations
suitable for hydropower generation experienced improvements in crop yields, and that
credit-constrained farmers subsequently shifted away from land-intensive cattle-grazing
and into cropping. As a result, agricultural land use declines, more native vegetation is
protected, and these effects persist 25 years later in both census and satellite data. Brazil’s
deforestation rate would have been almost twice as large between 1970 and 2000 without
that increase in agricultural productivity. That makes the conservation benefits of productivity improvements comparable to the most prominent conservation packages ever
implemented in Brazil.
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Introduction

The rapid loss of tropical forests is one of the major environmental disasters of the last
century. Tropical deforestation is the second-largest source of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and severely impacts the world’s biodiversity and water regimes
(Smith et al., 2014; Dasgupta, 2021). Around 90 percent of forest loss in the tropics is
to make space for crops and cattle (Curtis et al., 2018), which highlights a fundamental tension between conservation and development goals (Frank and Schlenker, 2016).
Improving agricultural productivity is thought to be necessary for economic development (World Bank, 2007), but would that exacerbate or alleviate the trade-off between
production and conservation?
This paper posits a new mechanism through which improvements in agricultural productivity could decrease deforestation. Our theory is inspired by the institutional details of agriculture in Brazil, one of the world’s largest producers of agricultural commodities. Farms in Brazil engage in two activities that differ in their factor intensities
– “cattle grazing” which is land-intensive, and “crop cultivation” which is relatively
more capital-intensive. Productivity shocks biased toward cropping induce creditconstrained farmers to switch to cultivation and decrease the land allocated to grazing.
The shift away from the land-intensive activity decreases land demand for agriculture,
ultimately protecting forests. However, increased agricultural productivity may induce entry into farming on the extensive margin, which makes the overall effect on
deforestation theoretically ambiguous. This motivates our empirical inquiry.
We explore these dynamics of agricultural land use and deforestation taking advantage of the large-scale expansion of the electricity grid into rural areas in Brazil during
the period 1960-2000, which improved agricultural productivity. Electricity directly
benefits agricultural production by enabling farmers to use techniques and equipment
that would otherwise be more costly or infeasible to implement. We first document –
using data from the censuses of agriculture – that farm electrification improved crop
productivity, but not the productivity of cattle grazing.
To address the endogeneity of infrastructure placement, we construct an instrument
based on a counterfactual electricity grid of the same size as the actual grid, but minimizing construction costs. This strategy, originally developed by Lipscomb et al.
(2013), takes advantage of the fact that most of the electricity expansion in Brazil was
based on hydropower generation, whose costs depend on topographic factors such as
water flow and river gradient.1 This allows us to isolate the variation in grid expansion
in Brazil that is attributable to exogenous cost considerations (holding fixed the geo1 An

analogous strategy has been used by the literature that estimates the economic effects of roads (see
e.g., Faber, 2014; Burgess et al., 2015; Baum-Snow et al., 2017; Banerjee et al., 2020).
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graphic attributes of each location) and use it as an instrument to estimate the effects
of farm electrification.
We construct a decennial panel dataset of Brazilian counties from 1960 to 2000, combining (a) historical measures of electricity infrastructure to reconstruct the evolution
of the electrical grid by decade (Lipscomb et al., 2013), (b) five waves of the Brazilian
Censuses of Agriculture to track farmland expansion, land use within farms, agricultural output, and input use, and (c) satellite images to characterize land use both inside
and outside farms.
We find that the increase in agricultural productivity driven by the expansion of the
electricity grid led to a slowdown of deforestation in Brazil over the period 1970-2006.
There is a 10 percentage point increase in farm electricity access in a county when the
infrastructure arrives, allowing farmers to move away from cattle grazing and shift
into cropping. This protects forests by decreasing agricultural land use overall. Our
estimates indicate that a 10 percent increase in a county’s electricity availability increases the proportion of land covered by native vegetation by 6.3 percentage points.
Brazil’s forest cover decreased by about 7 points between 1985 and 2006 (from 76%
to 69%), which means that without the increase in agriculture productivity brought
about through the rural electrification of Brazil, the rate of deforestation could have
been almost twice as large.
To understand the mechanism underlying these results, we document how agricultural practices change once farms are electrified. Electrification leads to increased investment in crop-related capital goods that benefit from electricity access, such as grain
storage facilities (which require humidity control and temperature control) and irrigation equipment. Crop yields increase as a result. The relative shift towards cropping
is also evident in increased investment in plows, planting and harvesting machines,
and tractors. In contrast, access to electricity has no effect on cattle grazing productivity. Land allocated to crop production expands while land allocated to cattle grazing
contracts. Since cattle grazing is land-intensive, the increased land-use in crops is not
sufficient to offset the decline in pastures.
We further use the data to interrogate a few critical assumptions made in the theoretical
model. We use rainfall shocks to show that many Brazilian farmers are indeed creditconstrained, and data on bank presence to show that our land use results are driven
by the more constrained farmers. We use longer-run data to show that the changes
in land use are not short-lived; they are evident even 25 years after the productivity
shock. Satellite imagery also confirms these patterns.
Our primary contribution is to the longstanding academic and policy debates regarding the link between agricultural productivity and deforestation. A prominent article
2

published in Science, Phalan et al. (2016), begins,
“One potential way to reduce [environmental impacts from agriculture] is
to increase food production per unit area on existing farmland, so as to
minimize farmland area and to spare land for habitat conservation”
This yield intensification effect is sometimes referred to as “Borlaug’s hypothesis”. On
the other hand, the very first page of an edited volume on the links between agricultural technologies and deforestation (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2001) recognizes that
improving agricultural productivity could instead incentivize individual producers to
expand farming and put greater pressure on forests, an argument that has been labeled
“Boserup’s hypothesis”.
We bring to this debate a plausible theoretical mechanism by which Borlaug’s hypothesis could materialize when farmers are credit-constrained, and then devise a rigorous empirical test of this mechanism. It is important to understand whether productivity improvements in agriculture offers any plausible path out of the fundamental tension between economic development and environmental conservation goals,2
because different world regions have followed alternative pathways to agricultural
output growth. Figure 1 illustrates how South Asia followed an intensification path,
whereby most of the gains in food production stemmed from increasing yields. In
the other extreme, Sub-Saharan countries followed the extensification path in which increases in food required expanding into new agricultural land. Latin American agriculture encroached on new land until the 1980s, and then shifted towards intensification.
Our paper also illuminates a creative policy tool to pursue forest conservation. Preventing deforestation via fines, bans, or designating areas as ‘protected’ is challenging
due to leakage that displaces deforestation towards unregulated areas. Regulators find
it difficult to enforce fines or bans, especially in developing countries (Burgess et al.,
2012, 2019; Harstad and Mideksa, 2017; Gonzalez Lira and Mobarak, 2019). Against
that backdrop, we find that a seemingly-unrelated policy of extending electrification
to rural areas changes farmers’ economic incentives in ways that inadvertently protect
the forest without any monitoring or policing requirement. The magnitude of the effect
on forest cover appears to be as large as the documented effect of the most prominent
package of direct conservation policies ever implemented in the Amazon called PPCDAM (Assunção et al., 2015). This suggests that conservation policies should maintain
2 Other

research shows that economic growth (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003), adoption of high-yield
seed varieties (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2001), and improvements in political accountability (Burgess
et al., 2012) benefit tropical forests. On the other hand, improvements in transport infrastructure (Pfaff,
1999; Cropper et al., 1999, 2001; Asher et al., 2020) and anti-poverty programs Alix-Garcia et al. (2013)
appear to have the opposite effect. There is a long-standing “environmental Kuznets curve literature
on the trade-offs between economic development and environmental conservation concerns (Grossman
and Krueger, 1991, 1995).
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Figure 1: Cereal Yields and Land under Cereal Production: 1961–2014
Notes: In the figure, each data point is one region-year, starting in 1961 (the left-most points) and ending
in 2014 (the top-most points). In South Asia, most of the increase in production came from rising yields,
with little addition of new agricultural land. In Sub-Saharan Africa, agricultural land increased more
than yields. Latin American followed the Sub-Saharan path until the 1980s and then shifted towards
the Asian model of agricultural growth. The figure reflects the Green Revolutions in Asia and Latin
America and suggests that, at a continental scale, Borlaug’s hypothesis holds true. Original data source
is the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Data was downloaded from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators.

a large focus on the economic interests of user groups. Policies such as direct payments
for ecosystem services (Porras et al., 2012; Jayachandran et al., 2017; Jayachandran,
2013) or interventions that improve farm productivity fall in this camp.
We also contribute to the literature on the effects of electrification. Lewis and Severnini
(2020), Chakravorty et al. (2016), and Dinkelman (2011) document economic benefits
of rural electrification in the U.S., Philippines and South Africa. Lee et al. (2020c) and
Burlig and Preonas (2016) find no significant economic gains from household electrification. As Lee et al. (2020b) discuss, the main difference between these studies and our
approach is that we study the impact of new electricity infrastructure at an aggregate
level, which benefits not only households but also firms, farms, and entire communities. Another important difference is the target population and time frame—while
Lee et al. (2020c) focuses on immediate impacts of electrification on poor rural households, we study 5-year and 25-year changes in land use over a 50-year horizon. A
third difference is that, as electricity rolled out, ready-to-implement technologies and
processes useful for farming that rely on electricity (like irrigation, drying, storage, and
processing) were already available (Fluck, 1992). Our setting shares the spirit of that
of Usmani and Fetter (2020), who show that rural electrification produces significant
economic effects in India only when preexisting economic opportunities are in place.
4
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Context: Agriculture in Brazil

In this section, we provide stylized facts about land use and agriculture during our
sample period. These stylized facts motivate the conceptual framework presented in
section 4, which guides our empirical analysis.
Land Use Table 1 provides an overview of farmland and land-use within farms during our study period. According to the Census of Agriculture, farms occupied 35 to
44 percent of the country’s territory between 1970 and 2006. Within farms, the land is
divided into pastures (mostly for cattle), cropland, and native vegetation. These three
land-use categories account for over 80 percent of farmland. “Native vegetation” is the
Census of Agriculture’s land use categorization for vegetation that has been not cultivated. This category refers to “forests” in most of Brazil, but savannas and steppes are
native to some areas.3 The share of farmland dedicated to pastures declined between
1970 and 2006, while the shares of cropland and native vegetation increased. Farmers keep native vegetation on their properties not only to extract forestry income, but
also because frictions in labor, credit, or rental markets may make some of the land
unprofitable to cultivate.

Table 1: Land Use in Brazil: 1970–2006
Shares of Land Use within Farmland
Farmland
Country Area

Pastures

Cropland

Native
Vegetation

Other

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.35
0.44
0.39

0.52
0.48
0.48

0.11
0.14
0.16

0.19
0.22
0.29

0.18
0.16
0.08

Year
1970
1985
2006

Source: Brazilian Census of Agriculture. The table shows country-wide figures published by IBGE between 1970 and 2006. Column 1 shows the total land in farms (farmland) divided by the country area. Column 2 shows pastureland divided by farmland.
Column 3 shows cropland used for annual crops, including fallowing, divided by farmland. Column 4 shows the area under native vegetation (matas naturais) divided by farmland. Column 5 shows the share of land in all other uses, which include perennial
crops; planted forests; farmsteads, buildings, livestock facilities, ponds, roads, and wasteland; and other non-cultivated land.

Crop Cultivation and Cattle Grazing Cattle grazing is a relatively land-intensive activity in Brazil, while crop cultivation is more intensive in physical and human capital.
To illustrate, table 2 shows measures of capital-to-land and labor-to-land ratios in crop
and livestock farms. For example, in 2006, the value of machinery per hectare in the
3 The

presence of trees within farms is a common feature in the tropics. For example, Zomer et al. (2014)
finds that 50 percent of agricultural land in Central America had at least 30 percent of tree cover in year
2000.
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typical livestock farm was one-fifth of that of a typical crop farm. Furthermore, crop
farms had three times as many workers per hectare than livestock farms. These figures
reflect the fact that only 4 percent of cattle farms use confinement, whereas over 60
percent of the harvested area of maize is mechanized, as is virtually all of the country’s
soybean production (IBGE, 2006). In short, cattle grazing requires low levels of capital
when compared to crop farming.

Table 2: Labor and Capital intensivity in Crop and Livestock Farms: 1970–2006
Workers Per 1,000 Hectares

Value of Machinery, Equipments, and
Vehicles Per Hectare

Crop farms

Livestock farms

Crop farms

Livestock farms

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

125
120
92

19
31
31

59
415
550

17
118
114

Year
1970
1985
2006

Source: Brazilian Census of Agriculture. The table shows country-wide figures published by IBGE between 1970 and 2006.

Credit and Labor Market Constraints Like many rural economies in the developing
world, farmers in Brazil face labor and capital constraints, and access to credit is far
from universal (Conning and Udry, 2007). Between 1970 and 2006, at least 80 percent
of Brazilian farmers had no access to external financing, and access to other financial
products such as insurance was even less common (IBGE, 2006). Agricultural labor
markets in developing economies are also plagued by search and informational frictions (Fink et al., 2020; Jeong, 2020), on top of the notoriously stringent employment
regulations in Brazil that make hiring and firing very costly (Ulyssea, 2010).
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Electricity and Agriculture

Rural Electrification in Brazil The electricity grid expanded massively during the
second half of the twentieth century in Brazil, particularly into rural areas. While 75
percent of urban households had access to electricity in 1970, only 4 percent of farms
were electrified. By 1995, the proportion of farms with access to the grid increased tenfold. Hydropower, which requires intercepting large amounts of water at high velocity,
supported virtually all of this expansion.
Electricity and Crop Production Electricity is valuable for agricultural production,
as it enables farmers to use techniques and equipment that would otherwise be more
costly or infeasible to implement (Fluck, 1992; Pimentel, 2009). Post-harvest storage
6

and processing of grains requires humidity control and machinery for drying grains,
including ventilators, which are cheaper to operate when electricity is available. Lewis
and Severnini (2020) analyze data from a rural electrification experiment in the 1920s
in the US where farm machines, excluding water pumping devices, consumed 30 percent of the electricity provided to farms, with consumption peaking during the harvest
season. Furthermore, electricity provides energy that is necessary to pump and distribute groundwater for irrigation. During the Green Revolution, electricity permitted
widespread irrigation and enabled Indian farmers to fully realize the productivity benefits of new seed varieties (Rud, 2012).4
Electricity and Livestock Production Livestock production can also benefit from electricity in theory, depending on the specific products the sector focuses on. Mechanized
milking, pasteurizing, and cooling of dairy products are energy-intensive processes
(Lewis and Severnini, 2020).5 However, 85 percent of the Brazilian cattle herd is for
beef production, and only one-fifth of the milk-producing farmers pasteurize their
milk, which is typically done in facilities outside the farm-gate (IBGE, 2006). Given
the nature of farming in Brazil, electricity has been far more important for crop production than for cattle grazing. This will drive an important assumption in our model,
and we will later verify in the data that electricity was indeed more beneficial for crop
production than for cattle.
Indirect effects of Electricity on Agricultural Production Electrification can affect
farm production through other less direct channels. For example, electricity can be
labor-saving in rural areas (Dinkelman, 2011). Since crop cultivation in Brazil is more
labor-intensive than cattle grazing, this channel would presumably also benefit crop
production more than livestock production, in line with our argument. Furthermore,
large-scale electrification may support the supply of services available to farmers, such
as banking, telecommunications, private sector supply chains, and extension services.
Rural electrification increases human capital accumulation (Lipscomb et al., 2013), and
rural amenities, which can attract more skilled people to rural areas. All of this can improve farm productivity, and again may have differential impacts on crop production
and animal husbandry.

4 While

diesel pumps are an alternative, diesel was especially expensive during oil price shocks in the
1970s (World Bank, 1990; Rud, 2012).
5 Industrial poultry farming is also energy-intensive, and benefits from electrification (Lewis and Severnini, 2020). However, poultry requires very little land and plays a minor role for the land use and
deforestation decisions we study in this paper. For this reason, we use the terms “livestock production”
and “cattle grazing” interchangeably in this paper.
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Conceptual Framework

In this section we build a simple, partial-equilibrium theoretical framework inspired
by the salient features of farming in Brazil, with the goal of generating predictions on
how a positive productivity shock to crop cultivation will affect farming choices and
deforestation. To mirror the language in our empirical exercise, we refer to the key
productivity parameter in our model as “availability of electricity” and denote it by Ω.
Set up The economy is endowed with total land of H which is initially covered by
native vegetation. A continuum of individuals reside in this economy, and each decides whether to become a farmer. These individuals differ in their opportunity cost
of operating a farm, θ ∼ Γ, which can be thought of as the wage rate in the non-farm
sector. The availability of electricity can affect farmers’ outside options, and so we assume that Ω shifts Γ in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance; the direction of
this shift depends on how electrification affects returns to farming relative to non-farm
activities.6 The equilibrium profit from farming, Π∗ , is common across farmers; the
mass of farmers is therefore Γ(θ ), where θ = {θ : θ ≤ Π∗ }.
Each farm is a tract of land of size H, which is fully covered by native vegetation before farming activities commence. Each farmer can engage in both crop cultivation and
cattle grazing, allocating Hc and Hg units of land to crops and pasture, respectively.
The production functions for the two activities are similar, except that crop cultivation
requires an additional factor, denoted by K. We think of K as capital, labor, or a combination of both. We make two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that electrification improves the productivity of crop cultivation, but not cattle grazing. Second,
we assume that only crop cultivation requires K. Specifically, we assume the following
forms for the production functions for crops and cattle grazing: C = ΩKF ( Hc ) and
G = F ( Hg ), with FH > 0, FHH < 0 and FH (0) = ∞.7
Land and capital can be bought at prices p and r, respectively. Farmers are credit
constrained and need to fund their expenditures with capital and land from their own
resources, M. We normalize the prices of C and G to 1.8 Thus, the farmer’s problem

6 Formally, an increase in electrification can cause the distribution of opportunity costs to dominate or be

dominated by the original distribution. If electrification improves farmers’ outside options more (less)
b ) ≤ (≥)Γ(θ; Ω
e ), for all Ω
b > Ω.
e
than it improves the returns to farming, then Γ(θ; Ω
7 The model’s substantive implications require only that crop cultivation is more capital-intensive, and
benefits relatively more from electrification, and both these assumptions are supported by the data.
8 To the extent that commodity prices are exogenous to local conditions, this normalization is innocuous.
In any case, making prices endogenous to the (local) productivity shock would not add predictive
power to this framework.
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can be written as:
max

K,Hc ,Hg

subject to

ΩKF ( Hc ) + F ( Hg ) − rK − p( Hc + Hg )

(1a)

rK + p( Hc + Hg ) ≤ M,

(1b)

Hc + Hg ≤ H.

(1c)

Predictions Since the profit function is linear in K and FH (0) = ∞, the resource constraint (1b) always binds. This is merely a modeling device, and what is essential in
this model is that farmers are constrained in their ability to hire K. Land will therefore
not be the limiting factor, and the land constraint (1c) will not bind. The solution to this
problem yields optimal land use and production choices with the following properties:
∂K ∗
>0
∂Ω

(2a)

∂Hc∗
>0
∂Ω

(2b)

∂Hg∗
∂Ω
∂( Hc∗ + Hg∗ )
∂Ω

<0

(2c)

<0

(2d)

The intuition behind equations (2a)–(2d) is straightforward. Since capital and land allocated to crops become more productive with electrification, K and Hc move in the
same direction as Ω, as shown in equations (2a) and (2b). However, since the credit
constraint binds, the farmer can only increase land allocated to crop cultivation and
hire more K if she decreases land allocated to cattle grazing (equation 2c). The total
demand for agricultural land within the farm, Hc∗ + Hg∗ , decreases in response to increases in electrification (equation 2d): as farmers substitute cropland for pastureland,
they also spend more on K and hence must give up more of Hg than they can increase
Hc .9
The net effect of electrification on deforestation depends not only on intensive-margin
changes in land demand within each farm, but also on how the productivity shock
induces extensive-margin changes in the decision to enter the agricultural sector. To
analyze this net effect, we define the total area of native vegetation, Hv , as the difference between the economy’s total land endowment and the farmer’s total land demand
for agricultural purposes:
Hv = H −

Z θ
−∞

( Hc∗ + Hg∗ )dΓ(θ )

9 In

(3)

reality, the price of cropland is typically higher than the price of pastureland, which would make the
negative effect on H even stronger. That would strengthen our prediction, but our model ignores that
margin. In the same vein, we assume that electrification does not increase input prices. If electrification
increases relative price p/r, farmers would adjust by spending more in K and less in Hc + Hg .

9

The derivative of the total area of native vegetation with respect to electrification has
two effects:
d( Hc∗ + Hg∗ )
dθ
dHv
=−
Γ(θ ) − ( Hc∗ + Hg∗ )Γ(θ )
dΩ
dΩ
dΩ}
|
{z
} |
{z
>0

(4)

≶0

The first term relates to the intensive-margin adjustment, through which electrification reduces the demand for agricultural land within farms. The second term is the
extensive-margin effect: electrification changes θ—the threshold in the distribution
of farming opportunity costs below which individuals decide to farm. Whether this
threshold increases or decreases with electrification depends on the changes in the returns to farming relative to returns in the non-farm sector.
The net effect on the forest is therefore theoretically ambiguous. We will examine each
of the two (intensive and extensive margin) effects separately in the data, and then
combine them quantitatively to infer the total effect of a productivity shock on deforestation.
To summarize, this model makes a few assumptions about the agricultural production
function that we can examine in the data, and yields a few further testable predictions.
First, we make the testable assumption that electrification increases crop cultivation
productivity more than cattle grazing productivity. Second, we assume that farmers
face constraints in factor markets. Beyond the support for this assumption that we
have already provided in section 3, we will formally test its implications using variation in rainfall and credit access. Third, the model predicts that electrification should
lead to greater investments in capital, specifically in capital that is useful for crop farming. Fourth, the model predicts that positive productive shocks induce farmers to shift
land use from cattle grazing to crop cultivation. Finally, the model highlights that electrification has intensive- and extensive margin effects on the demand for agricultural
land. On the intensive margin, it reduces demand for agricultural land through reductions in land demand for cattle grazing. Increases in land demand for crop cultivation
are not enough to offset the reduction in land demand for cattle grazing. The effects
on the extensive margin are ambiguous. Demand for farmland may or may not increase depending on the relative magnitude of farms’ profits vis-à-vis farmers’ outside
options.

5

Data Sources and Variable Definitions

We build a decennial panel dataset of Brazilian counties from 1960 to 2000 that combines data from three main sources. First, we use historical measures of electricity
10

infrastructure and the evolution of the grid by decade compiled by Lipscomb et al.
(2013), who also provide an instrument for the growth of electrification in Brazil (further described in section 6). Second, we use five waves of the Brazilian Censuses of
Agriculture to track farmland expansion, land use within farms, agricultural output,
and inputs. Finally, we use data derived from satellite imagery, which has the advantage of measuring land use for the entire county, although it cannot distinguish
between land use within and outside of farms.
The number of counties (or municípios) in Brazil increased from 2,766 to 5,564 during
our study period due to redistricting. The concordances provided by Reis et al. (2011)
and Ehrl (2017) enables us to construct a balanced panel of minimum comparable areas
that remain constant over this period. After merging data from all sources, our panel
contains 2,172 “standardized counties”. Table 3 presents summary statistics for the
data we use. We now describe these data.
Electricity Infrastructure Lipscomb et al. (2013) compile digital maps of the electricity grid in Brazil for the period 1960-2000 based on archival research that identifies the
locations and construction dates of hydro-power plants, transmission lines, and substations.10 The authors obtained reports, inventories, and maps from major regional
electricity companies in Brazil operating during that period, and consolidated that information into the status of the electricity grid in each decade. Following Lipscomb
et al. (2013), we divide Brazil into 32,578 evenly spaced grid points; in counties with a
power plant or substation, we assume that all grid points within a 50-kilometer radius
of the county’s centroid have access to electricity.11 Our county-level electricity access
variable is defined as the county’s proportion of grid points that are electrified.
Agricultural Data The Brazilian Census of Agriculture is a comprehensive source of
data on the universe of farms in the country.12 We use county-level aggregations from
the following five waves of the Census of Agriculture: 1970, 1975, 1985, 1996, and 2006.
These waves match agricultural outcomes to the electricity infrastructure data with a
five-year lag. We use the census data to investigate the effects of electrification on three
sets of outcomes: agricultural output, land use, and capital use.
10 Transmission

lines transport electricity from power plants to substations in regions where the electricity will be used. Substations reduce voltage, making the electricity suitable for the distribution lines
that ultimately supply electricity to firms, farms, and households.
11 We proceed in this way because the authors compiled historical data on generation plants and transmission stations, and it was not feasible to collect direct data on the many distribution companies operating during the period. Distribution networks stretch one-hundred kilometers on average, which
is why we choose the 50-km radius.
12 The Census of Agriculture surveys all rural establishments in the country. The definition of a rural establishment is similar to what would be commonly thought of as a farm: a continuous plot of land under a single operator, with some rural economic activity – crop, vegetable or flower farming, orchards,
animal grazing or forestry. There are no restrictions on the plot size, tenure, or market participation.
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When looking at agricultural output, we measure crop yields by diving total grain
production by harvested area of all major grains: maize, cotton, soybeans, beans, rice,
and wheat. For cattle grazing, we use the stocking ratio, i.e., heads of cattle divided by
hectares of pastureland. We measure changes in the composition of farm production
using the cattle share of farm production value, which captures the relative variation
in physical output and prices.
To examine the effects on land use, we start by using the proportion of county area
in farms (farmland). We then examine the within-farmland shares of three land-use
categories—cropland, pastures, and native vegetation13 . Cropland is the harvested area of
all major grains: maize, cotton, soybeans, beans, rice, and wheat, which on average
corresponds to 87 percent of the harvested area of all annual crops during our sample
period.
Finally, to test our model’s prediction that electrification increases investment in croprelated capital, we use the per-hectare number of tractors, planting and harvesting
machines, plows, and grain storage facilities as measures of farm capital stock. We
also use the proportion of farms that use irrigation.
Satellite Data We complement our analysis using satellite-based classification of land
use. Specifically, we use data from collection 3 of the Brazilian Annual Land Use and
Land Cover Mapping Project (MapBiomas), which provides land-use classifications
based on annual composites of LANDSAT images from 1985 to 2017. MapBiomas classifies each 30m x 30m pixel into 20 land use categories using algorithms specific to each
of the six Brazilian biomes.14 We downloaded per-county aggregations with total area
in each land use category for 1985, 1995, and 2005, to match the years in the Census of
Agriculture data. We then aggregate the 20 land-use categories in the satellite data into
four classes that match well with the agricultural census data: natural vegetation, pastures, cropland, and others. Finally, we match these data to the electricity infrastructure
data with a 25-year lag, on average. The main advantage of satellite measurements is
that they contain information on land use in the whole county, not only within farms.

13 The

remaining farm area includes orchards, annual crops other than grains, planted forests, buildings
and facilities, water bodies and non-arable land. The area in planted forests is small, and bundling it
with native vegetation makes no quantitative difference in our results.
14 To our knowledge, MapBiomas is the only satellite data product with land use classification for the entire Brazilian territory and this time period. The data and classification methods are publicly available
at mapbiomas.org/en.
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Table 3: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Electricity
Electricity Infrastructure
Modeled electricity instrument
Percent of Farms Electrified

0.75
0.74
0.33

0.40
0.43
0.35

0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
2.05

Land Use
Farmland/County Area
Pastures/Farmland
Cropland/Farmlanda
Native Vegetation/Farmland

0.71
0.47
0.11
0.18

0.27
0.24
0.15
0.15

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

6.26
0.95
3.14
0.99

6.16
27.34
10.11
20.46
22.94

10.94
85.90
23.69
38.35
38.50

Capital usage
Percentage of Farms with Irrigation
Grain Storage Facilitiesa
Planting and Harvesting Machinesa
Plowsa
Tractorsa

0.00
93.28
0.00 3,263.17
0.00
669.86
0.00
587.97
0.00
868.05

Agricultural output
Grain Yields (log)a
Heads of Cattle Per Hectare
Share of Cattle Production Value

0.07
1.07
0.29

0.79 -2.77
0.76 0.12
0.22 0.00

Land Use - Satellite Data
Pastures/Couny Area
Cropland/County Area
Native Vegetation/County Area

0.48
0.09
0.36

0.28
0.17
0.27

0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
0.91
1.00

Other
Number of Bank Branchesa

0.64

3.10

0.00

112.1

Number of Counties
Number of observations

3.01
13.24
0.99

2,172
10,860

a Per 10,000 hectares of county
Notes: The data is a decennial panel of standardized counties from 1960 to 2000.
area. See Appendix B for more detailed descriptions of variable definitions and sources.
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6

Empirical Strategy

We estimate the effect of electrification on land-use decisions using a decennial panel
of counties. Assuming a linear and additive structure, we are interested in producing
an unbiased estimate of θ in an equation of the following form:
Yc,t+1 = αc + γt + ρEct + υct ,

(5)

where Yc,t+1 is the outcome of interest (e.g., land use) in county c at time t + 1, αc
is a county fixed effect, γt is a time fixed effect, and Ect is our measure of electricity
infrastructure—the proportion of grid points in county c that are electrified at time t.
Estimating (5) by OLS is likely to produce biased estimates of ρ because the placement
of electricity infrastructure is not random. For example, infrastructure may expand to
areas where the demand and economic returns are high, or may be allocated by the
government to under-served areas. Since these factors are unobserved to us, they will
be in υct , and may affect the demand for agricultural land. The correlation between Ect
and υct could create a bias in the OLS estimator in either direction.
The Instrument To overcome these identification concerns, we use an instrumental
variable (IV) approach. We instrument Ect with the output of an electricity infrastructure expansion model that is based only on engineering cost considerations. Our
approach, originally developed in Lipscomb et al. (2013), takes advantage of two facts.
First, hydropower accounts for the majority of electricity generation in Brazil. The cost
to build a hydropower plant is largely determined by geography. Hydropower plants
require a steep river gradient and a large amount of water flow to create pressure from
the water descending through the turbines. Although creating these conditions artificially is possible through large investments, naturally steep areas with high water flow
have a clear cost-advantage. Second, the expansion of the electrical grid in Brazil was
led by the federal government. We are thus able to identify the budget for electricity
generation in each decade that determined the expansion. We use this information
on the country-wide scale of expansion to introduce panel variation in the instrument,
similar to the approach in Duflo and Pande (2007). Our basic strategy is to forecast how
the grid would have evolved decade-by-decade, if it expanded from low to high-cost
locations.
To construct our instrument—predicted electricity availability—we mimic the (counterfactual) decision-making of a planner who focuses only on engineering costs (and
ignores demand) to determine the expansion of the electricity network. Using a spatial
grid of 32,578 evenly spaced points, we build a model that predicts electricity availability at each grid point-decade, and we then aggregate it to the county-decade level.
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The model works in three steps.
The first step provides a ranking of the cross-section of grid points based on their suitability for a hydropower plant. To do that, we create a hydropower suitability index
for every grid point based on topographic factors (water flow accumulation and river
gradient) and the presence of dense forests, which are also known to considerably increase construction costs. The suitability index is the predicted probability of the point
receiving a hydropower plant from a probit regression in which the dependent variable indicates whether the location has a dam built as of the year 2000 (the end of our
sample period). Appendix table B.1 shows the result of this probit regression.
The second step determines which point-decades are allocated a hydropower plant by
the hypothetical planner seeking to minimize cost. For example, we know that the
first decade’s budget allowed for the construction of 53 new plants. Therefore, the 53
lowest-cost locations are allocated generation plants in the first decade in the instrument we construct. The second decade’s budget allowed for the construction of 36 new
plants, which means that the next 36 lowest-cost locations would receive a generation
plant, and so on for every subsequent decade. In the third and final step, we simulate
the lowest cost placement of two transmission substations per generation plant and
assume that all grid points within 50 kilometers of a predicted plant or substations
are electrified. These steps are explained in greater detail in Lipscomb et al. (2013).
In building this hypothetical grid, we impose the common-sense constraint that areas
already electrified don’t need additional infrastructure.
Estimation Our instrument is the fraction of grid points in each county-decade predicted to be electrified by this model, so it is designed the capture how the grid would
have evolved over decades had investment decisions been made solely on the basis of
geography-driven construction cost considerations. Denoting the instrument by Zct ,
we estimate the following system of equations by two-stage least squares:
Ect = α1c + γt1 + δZc,t + θ 1 Xc,t + ηc,t
bc,t + θ 2 Xc,t + ε c,t
Yc,t+1 = α2c + γt2 + β E

(6)
,

(7)

bc,t are the fitted values from the first stage regression (6). Note that both Zc,t
where E
and Ec,t are county-level averages of grid point values. We therefore weight regressions
by the county’s number of grid points. We cluster standard errors by county. In our
preferred specification, we include interactions between the hydropower suitability
index and time fixed effects in both estimating equations, which flexibly control for
geography-specific trends. As we discuss below, these controls help the credibility of
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our exclusion restriction.15
Identification Our identification is based on the hypothetical grid’s expansion to less
attractive, higher cost locations for hydropower over time. Because we have time variation in (actual and modelled) electrification across counties, we can include county
fixed-effects in our IV estimation. This means that time-invariant geographic characteristics, such as elevation, slope, and water availability, do not contribute to identifying the (local average) treatment effects that we estimate. This is important because a
key threat to identification would otherwise be that geographic factors like elevation
and water flow directly affect agriculture. In our fixed-effects framework, the exclusion
restriction concerns the decade-by-decade process of evolution of our hypothetical electricity grid, which produces discontinuous jumps in the probability of early-versus-late
electrification in certain locations. The 53 lowest-cost locations are electrified in the
first decade, but locations with topographic factors that barely miss the cut (that rank
54, 55, 56, etc, in the first step of instrument construction) have to wait for the next
decade to receive power. Location fixed-effects and trends specific to the suitability
ranking16 absorb much of the geographic variation in the instrument, thereby isolating
these discontinuities in our cost-based forecast for a county to be electrified as the key
source of identification. Our argument is that these discontinuous jumps in receiving
power early-versus-late are unlikely to be directly related to the continuous evolution
of farmland expansion, pasture-to-cropland conversion, and deforestation, and should
not violate the exclusion restriction in our IV strategy.
Moreover, our model of grid expansion predicts that electrification evolves from areas
with high slopes and water volume to areas with low slopes and no water. Historically,
the expansion of agricultural land and, more generally, population tracks water availability. However, agricultural land and population also evolve from areas with low
slopes to areas with higher slopes. The interplay of these two geographic factors in opposite directions implies that the dynamics of our instrument should not be collinear
with the dynamics of agriculture and population movements, which strengthens the
confidence in our exclusion restriction. The fact that our instrument is not collinear
with population dynamics also alleviates concerns that it predicts the expansion of
other types of infrastructure such as sanitation or roads. That said, road-building and
15 Our

panel data contains five distinct time periods. We use the subscripts Yc,t+1 and Ect in equation
(7) to denote the fact that outcome variables Y collected from various waves of the agricultural census
are matched to the electricity infrastructure data that is typically lagged about 5 years. For example,
in the first period defined in our dataset, the 1970 agricultural census is matched to the electricity grid
for the 1960s reported in Lipscomb et al. (2013), while the last period is the 2006 census matched to the
electricity grid in the early 2000s.
16 We flexibly control for a polynomial in the suitability index interacted with time-fixed effects in our
preferred specification, to alleviate concerns about spurious common trends between our predicted
grid expansion instrument and spatial patterns of agricultural expansion and deforestation.
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electric-grid development often go hand-in-hand. However, even if our instrument
predicts that broader set of infrastructure, we are only interested in using that as an
agricultural productivity shock to explore subsequent changes in land use. Whether
the productivity shock comes from rural electrification alone, or a combination of electricity and roads, is not a first-order concern for this paper. It could change the precise
policy implication for governments interested in conserving forests (“improve agricultural productivity” as opposed to “invest in electrification”), and we should be careful
about the subtleties in interpretation.
A weakness of our IV approach, as we detail in appendix D.2, is that our instrument
becomes weak in the first stage if we directly control for trends specific to each component of the geographic factors used in the instrument: water flow, river gradient and
the Amazon. To avoid the weak instrument problem, we instead control for trends
specific to the hydropower suitability index, which combines those three inputs into a
single index. Appendix D.2 shows that inclusion of the Amazon-specific time trends is
the main culprit that makes our first-stage weak, so that appendix also explores the sensitivity to removing the Amazon region entirely from the analysis. The Amazon region
accounts for 59% of the land area of Brazil, and therefore 59% of the grid points used
for instrument construction fall within the Amazon. Our IV approach breaks down
when excluding these 59% of the effective (weighted) sample because the instrument
becomes too weak. However, we retain adequate first-stage power at conventional
levels (F-stat>10) when excluding up to two-thirds of the Amazon territory. Specifically, we divide Amazonian counties into three groups with approximately equal area
– counties either belong to the state of Pará, Amazonas state, or other states. Excluding
any two of these groups at a time keeps the second-stage results largely unchanged,
and the main conclusions of our paper are retained.
Instrument Validity Tests We perform other exercises to explore the validity of our
empirical strategy. First, we check whether the spatial dynamics of farm production
follows the same pattern as our forecast of electricity grid expansion. To do that, we
compute correlations between the rank order of a county’s hydropower suitability and
the rank order for two indicators—farm production value per hectare and the county’s
share of farmland—within regions of Brazil and within years.17 This is a stringent test
of our identification assumptions because in our analysis we use county fixed-effects,
and not region fixed-effects. Table 4 shows the results. For most regions and decades,
these correlations range from 0.01 to 0.21 in absolute value. The exceptions are in the
Center-West region, where the magnitudes hover between 0.10 and 0.54. This can be a
source of concern, and in appendix D.3, we show that the main results of our paper do
17 Lipscomb

et al. (2013) perform a similar exercise and find low correlations between the suitability
index and population density and GDP.
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Table 4: Spearman Correlations: Hydropower Suitability and Agriculture
Year
Region

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

Panel A: Hydropower Suitability and Farm Production Value Per Hectare
North
North East
South East
South
Center West

−0.185
−0.129
−0.026
0.071
0.384

−0.176
−0.106
−0.021
0.041
0.543

−0.171
−0.028
−0.040
0.055
0.536

−0.209
−0.059
−0.057
0.058
0.445

−0.134
−0.011
−0.067
0.056
0.106

0.197
0.116
−0.015
0.065
0.455

0.191
0.081
−0.022
0.053
0.439

Panel B: Hydropower Suitability and Share of Farmland
North
North East
South East
South
Center West

0.177
0.119
0.013
0.061
0.479

0.185
0.094
0.015
0.066
0.529

0.184
0.070
0.001
0.056
0.539

Notes: Each cell presents a Spearman rank order correlation, by region and decade. In Panel A, the correlation is computed between the suitability rank for hydropower generation and the rank for the farm production value per hectare. In Panel B, the
correlation is computed between the suitability rank for hydropower generation and farmland share of the county area.

not change if we exclude the center-west region from the analysis.
Second, we check whether placement of power plants and transmission lines simulated by the forecasting model can be predicted by farm production indicators in earlier years. We do so by estimating equations of the form instrumentit = βoutcomei,t−1 +
λt + θi + ξ it . Under the null that our instrument is as good as random the estimates of β
should be statistically equal to zero. Table 5 displays the results. Almost all coefficients
are small in magnitude. The largest coefficient is the one associated with the share of
cropland, which implies that converting 100% of farm area into crops in one decade
increases our instrument 0.19 in the subsequent decade, an effect of 0.44 standard deviations. Three other coefficients are statistically significant, but their magnitudes are
small. Overall, past agricultural outcomes do not appear to be strong predictors of the
instrument.

7
7.1

Empirical Results
First-stage results and Electricity Adoption by Farms

Table 6 shows whether our instrument — the hypothetical grid expansion based on
cost considerations — predicts the actual evolution of Brazil’s electricity grid. The
specification in column 1, which uses county as well as time fixed effects, confirms a
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Table 5: Instrument Validty
Dependent Variable: Instrument at t
Outcomes at t − 1

coefficient

std. error

partial R2

Land Use – Census of Agriculture
Farmland/County Area

−0.062∗∗∗

0.013

0.006

Pastures/Farmland

−0.024

0.024

0.001

Cropland/Farmland

0.191∗∗∗

0.036

0.010

Native Vegetation/Farmland

−0.008

0.011

0.000

0.013

0.031

0.000

0.084

0.076

0.001

−0.024

0.034

0.000

Farm Production and Capital Usage
Grain Yields (log)

0.019∗∗∗

0.006

0.007

Heads of Cattle Per Hectare

0.004

0.003

0.000

−0.047∗∗∗

0.012

0.003

−0.000

0.000

0.000

Percentage of Farms with Irrigation

0.000

0.001

0.000

Planting and Harvesting Machines

0.000

0.000

0.000

Plows

−0.000

0.000

0.000

Tractors

−0.000

0.000

0.000

Land Use – Satellite Data
Pastures/County Area
Cropland/County Area
Forest/County Area

Share of Cattle Production Value
Grain Storage Facilities

This table shows the extent to which our instrument—the forecast expansion of electricity infrastructure—can be predicted by
agricultural indicators in earlier years. Each row shows results from a regression of the form instrumentit = βoutcomei,t−1 + θi +
λt + ε it . Sample size of each regression is 6,516. Standard errors clustered by county.

19

strong and significant correlation between modeled electrification and actual electricity
infrastructure. If our model predicts that a county should get electrified in a certain
decade, the likelihood of that county actually receiving electrification increases by 25
percentage points. Column 2 adds flexible controls for geographic-specific trends by
including a quartic polynomial of the hydroelectric suitability index interacted with
time fixed-effects. The point estimate decreases from 0.25 to 0.21, and the partial Fstatistic decreases from 42.9 to 24.6. We use this more conservative specification from
column 2 in the remaining results reported in this paper.
While these F-statistics are above the thresholds traditionally used as a rule of thumb
as suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997), recent work by Lee et al. (2020a) shows that
conventional clustered standard errors may be biased downward when the F-statistic
is below 104.7. With an F-statistic of 24.6, the tF critical value is 2.47 (Lee et al., 2020a,
Table 3), which implies that the 95% tF-corrected confidence intervals (CIs) are 25 percent wider than conventional CIs. In appendix table D.1, we reproduce all second-stage
results along with the tF-corrected 95% CIs suggested in Lee et al. (2020a). None of the
tf-corrected CIs include zero when conventional CIs do not.
Column 3 explores whether the instrument predicts electrification of farms, based on
questions directly asked to farm operators in the agricultural census. Our instrument
not only predicts the arrival of grid infrastructure, but also adoption of electricity by
farms. When the hypothetical cost-minimizing grid is predicted to arrive in a county,
the farm electrification rate in that county increases by 11 percentage points.18 Column
4 shows that panel variation in decade-by-decade changes in Lipscomb et al. (2013)’s
historical grid infrastructure data is strongly positively correlated with changes in proportion of farms that report being electrified in the agricultural census, controlling for
county and time fixed effects.

7.2

Does electrification affect agricultural productivity?

We now test the central assumption of our theoretical framework, namely that electricity improves agricultural productivity, and that the productivity shock is biased
towards crop farming rather than livestock-rearing. We use our IV strategy to estimate
the effects of electricity on measures of crop and cattle production. Table 7 shows the
results. Column 1 shows that electricity increases crop yields: the IV estimate implies
that a 10 percentage point increase in electricity infrastructure increases yields by 12
percent (p-value < 0.001). In contrast, column 2 shows that the cattle stock density
18 We

will use this fact to calibrate how we report effect sizes in the rest of the paper. Since arrival
of infrastructure increases the proportion of farms electrified by 11 percentage points (pp), we will
highlight changes in productivity and deforestation as a result of a 10 pp increase in electrification, to
keep the arithmetic simple and benchmark the magnitudes to something like an intent-to-treat effect
of electrification policy.
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Table 6: First-Stage Results and Electricity Adoption

Dependent Variable

Modeled Electricity Infrastructure

First Stage

Electricity
Adoption

Electricity
Infrastructure

Proportion of
Farms with
Electricity

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.249∗∗∗
[0.038]

0.209∗∗∗
[0.042]

0.113∗∗∗
[0.033]

(4)

0.137∗∗∗
[0.022]

Electricity Infrastructure

Year dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Quartic suitability rank × year dummies

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

10,860
2,172
0.750
42.9

10,860
2,172
0.750
24.6

10,860
2,172
0.334

10,860
2,172
0.334

Observations
Number of Counties
Mean of Outcome
Partial F-stat

Notes: In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the prevalence of electricity infrastructure in the county, measured from infrastructure inventories. In columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is the fraction of farms with electricity in the county, measured
from the Censuses of Agriculture. These columns confirm that both the instrument and our measure of electricity infrastructure
correlate with a measure of rural electrification contained in our main dataset. All specifications are weighted by the number of
grid points contained in the county. Standard errors clustered at the county level in brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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does not increase with electricity—both the OLS and IV estimates are negative, small,
and not statistically significant. These results support the interpretation that electrification is a productivity shock that benefits crop cultivation more than cattle grazing.
Table 7: The Effects of Electricity on Agricultural Production

Dependent Variable

(1)
Grain Yields (log)

(2)
Heads of Cattle Per
Hectare of Pastureland

(3)
Cattle Production
Value/Farm Production
Value

IV

1.152∗∗∗
[0.303]

−0.167
[0.296]

−0.359∗∗∗
[0.129]

OLS

0.109∗∗∗
[0.040]

−0.011
[0.067]

0.027∗
[0.015]

10,700
0.07

10,648
1.07

10,860
0.29

Observations
Mean dep. var.

Notes: This table shows that electricity infrastructure is a positive productivity shock to crop cultivation (column 1) but not to
cattle grazing (column 2). A corollary is that farm production shifts away from cattle grazing (column 3). The dependent variable
in column 1 is the log of grain yields (production, in thousands of tons, divided by grain harvested area in the county). Grains
include maize, soybeans, cotton, wheat, beans, and rice. The dependent variable in column 2 is the number of cattle heads per
hectare of pastureland in the county. The dependent variable in column 3 is the ratio of cattle production value to total farm
production value. All regressions are weighted by the number of grid points in the county, and include county fixed effects and
interactions between time fixed effects and a quartic polynomial on the suitability index. Standard errors clustered at the county
level in brackets.

Electricity could impact farm production in ways that do not necessarily improve
yields. For instance, electrification could raise incomes and increase the local demand
for beef. Electrification could thus be a demand shock which benefits cattle grazing
without necessarily affecting the density of the cattle herd. Under those conditions,
farmers would find it profitable to expand cattle production instead of crop cultivation, which is the opposite of what our model predicts. Alternatively, the price of
grains may decrease in response to higher yields, maintaining cattle as a larger component of the revenue of the farm relative to grains. We therefore test crop versus cattle
production’s contributions to farm revenue in column 3, which uses the cattle share
of the total farm production value as the dependent variable. The negative IV estimate implies that a 10 pp increase in electricity infrastructure leads to a 3.6 percentage
point reduction in cattle production as a proportion of the total value of production on
the farm. Therefore, farmers increase crop production substantially more than cattle
production in response to an increase in electrification.

7.3

Changes in Land Use Decisions

Our model predicts that farmers will increase the share of farmland allocated to crop
cultivation and decrease land allocated to cattle pasture after receiving the positive
shock to crop cultivation productivity. Further, the increase in cropland will not fully
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Table 8: The Effects of Electricity on Land Use
(1)
Pastures
Farmland

(2)
Cropland
Farmland

(3)
Native Vegetation
Farmland

(4)
Farmland
County Area

−0.494∗∗∗
[0.167]

0.183∗∗∗
[0.068]

0.392∗∗∗
[0.147]

−0.516∗∗∗
[0.148]

OLS

0.028
[0.020]

0.000
[0.007]

0.033
[0.028]

−0.063∗∗
[0.027]

Observations
Mean dep. var.

10,860
0.47

10,860
0.11

10,860
0.18

10,860
0.71

Dependent Variable
IV

All regressions are weighted by the number of grid points in the county and include county fixed effects and a quartic polynomial
on the suitability index interacted with time fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

offset the decrease in pastureland because of differences in land-intensity and factor
market constraints. Within farms, the demand for total land across all agricultural
uses will fall as a result. Electrification and increased crop productivity will produce
land-sparing effects.
In contrast to these clear predictions on land use within farms, the model delivers ambiguous predictions regarding the effects of electrification on the expansion of farming
as a whole. Farmland may expand or contract depending on whether electricity benefits farm or non-farm sectors more.
Table 8 shows the effects of electrification on land use. Columns 1–3 show changes in
the share of land within farms allocated to pastures, cropland, and native vegetation,
respectively. The coefficients’ signs are in line with our model’s predictions. When a
county gets electrified, there is a clear shift away from pastures in favor of cropland. A
10 percentage point increase in electrification lowers the share of farmland in pastures
by 5 percentage points, and increases the share allocated to grains by 2 percentage
points. The cropland expansion is smaller than the reduction in pastures, corroborating
the land-sparing prediction of our model. This leads to a net positive effect on native
vegetation increasing its land-share within farms by 4 percentage points (column 3). In
sum, a positive productivity shock to crop cultivation has a land-sparing effect within
farms, which protects native vegetation.
Next, column 4 shows the effects of electrification on farmland expansion. The negative coefficient in column 4 implies that farmland expands less rapidly once counties
get electrified. A 10 percentage point increase in electricity infrastructure lowers the
county’s share of farmland by 5 percentage points. Our model would explain this negative coefficient as evidence that access to electricity improves farmers’ outside options
more than the returns to agriculture, on average.
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7.3.1

Net Effect on Total Native Vegetation Inside and Outside Farms

The Census of Agriculture, by definition, does not report land-use outside farms, which
prevents us from directly estimating the effect of improving crop productivity on total
(county-wide) native vegetation. However, we can combine the estimates in columns
3 and 4 of Table 8 with other data moments to estimate total effects on county-wide
native vegetation. Let VT denote total native vegetation, VI native vegetation inside
farms, and k(C − F ) native vegetation outside of farms, expressed as a fraction k ∈ [0, 1]
of the difference between county area C and farmland F. This notation gives us an accounting identity for native vegetation: VT = VI + k (C − F ), which we can use to
derive an expression for the effect of electrification on total native vegetation19 :


∂(VT /C )
∂( F/C )
VI
=
·
−k
∂Ω
∂Ω
F
{z
}
|
extensive-margin effect

+

∂(VI /F ) F
·
| ∂Ω{z C}

,

(8)

intensive- margin effect

All terms on the right-hand side of (8) are reported in Table 8 other than the share of
∂( F/C )
native vegetation outside of farms, k. Column 4 provides estimates of ∂Ω and the
∂(VI /F )
mean CF , whereas column 3 provides estimates of ∂Ω
and the mean VFI . We use these
to calculate the total effect on native vegetation in table 9 under different assumptions
about the value of k.
Column 2 presents our preferred estimate, in which we infer the value of k by combining data from the census of agriculture with satellite data.20 Under this assumption of
k = 0.86, our regression estimates imply a 10 percentage point increase in electrification increases the county’s share of native vegetation by 6.3 percentage points.21
Since k is unknown, columns 1 and 4 provide upper and lower bounds on this estimate.
∂( F/C )
Since the estimate of ∂Ω is negative, assuming that all land outside of farms is covered by native vegetation, or k = 1, gives an upper limit to the effect on total native
vegetation. Assuming k = 0 yields a lower limit. The upper limit displayed in column
1 implies that a 10 percentage point increase in electrification increases the share of
native vegetation by 7 percentage points. If land outside farms is entirely deforested
(k = 0), the effect decreases to 1.9 percentage points, and loses statistical significance
(column 4). Column 3 assumes that the share of native vegetation is equal within and
19 See

appendix A.2 for the derivation.

20 The census data imply that native vegetation inside farms accounts for 0.71

× 0.18 = 13% of the typical
county’s area. In the satellite data, native vegetation accounts for 38% of the typical county. Therefore,
the share of native vegetation outside of farms should be roughly (0.38 - 0.13)/(1 - 0.71) = 86%.
21 To calculate the standard error of this linear combination of regression coefficients, we treat the sample
∂( F/C )
averages CF and VFI as constants. To obtain the covariance between the estimates of ∂Ω and CF , we
stack observation on outcomes and fully interact equations 6 and 7 with an indicator for the outcome.
Alternatively, we can calculate the standard errors by bootstrapping, which yields very similar results
to the ones we report.
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Table 9: Effect of Electrification on Total Native Vegetation
Assumed native vegetation cover outside of farms
(1)
Full Cover
(k = 1)

(2)
Implied by data
(k = 0.86)

(3)
Equal Cover
(k = 0.18)

(4)
No cover
(k = 0)

IV

0.701∗∗∗
[0.138]

0.629∗∗∗
[0.125]

0.278∗∗∗
[0.105]

0.186
[0.115]

OLS

0.075∗∗∗
[0.025]

0.066∗∗∗
[0.023]

0.023
[0.020]

0.012
[0.021]

This table presents the effects of electrification on total native vegetation for different assumptions regarding the state of native
vegetation outside of farms, which we do not observe with the Census of Agriculture data. The effects are weighted averages of
the marginal effects in farmland and native vegetation inside farms, shown in Table 8. The weights are, respectively, the share of
farmland (sample mean: 0.71) and the difference between the shares of native vegetation inside (sample mean: 0.18) and outside
of farms (denoted by k in equation (8)). We have no data on this last share, so we make four assumptions: in column 1, we assume
that non-farmland is fully covered by native vegetation (k = 1); in column 2, we assume that k = 0.86, which is what satellite and
census of agriculture data jointly imply; Column 3 assumes that non-farmland and farmland have the same share of native vegetation (k = 0.18); and Column 4 assumes that non-farmland has no native vegetation (k = 0). To obtain the covariances needed for
computing the standard errors, we re-estimate the regressions in Table 8 stacking the outcomes and estimating the both marginal
effects jointly in one regression.

outside farms, and this yields an effect of 2.8 percentage points (p<0.01).
To assess the magnitude of a 6.3 percentage point increase in native vegetation, it is
helpful to consider to overall state of native vegetation in Brazil. In 1985, the midpoint
of our study period, 76% of Brazil’s area was covered by native vegetation according to
the satellite-based land use classification that we use (see section 5). By 2006, that figure
had dropped to 69%. This implies that without the increase in agriculture productivity
brought about by the expansion of rural electrification in Brazil between 1970 and 2000,
the rate of deforestation (or loss in natural vegetation) would have been almost twice
as large. Our estimates suggest that instead of a 7 percentage point decrease in native
vegetation between 1985 and 2005, we might have seen a (6.3+7) = 13.3 percentage
point loss, if farms had not received that access to electricity which permitted them to
move away from cattle grazing.
This effect size is comparable to estimates of the effects the most prominent package of
conservation policies implemented in the mid-2000s to curb deforestation in the Amazon that is known by the Portuguese acronym PPCDAM. This policy package included
heavier penalties for illegal deforestation and tighter enforcement of environmental
regulations(Burgess et al., 2019; Assunção et al., 2015, 2019a). Assunção et al. (2015)
estimate that deforestation rates would have more than doubled in the absence of this
package of policies.
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Table 10: Long Run Effects of Electricity on the Allocation of Land: Census of Agriculture Data

Dependent Variable
IV
OLS
Observations
Mean dep. var.

(1)
Pastures
Farmland

(2)
Grain Area
Farmland

(3)
Native Vegetation
Farmland

(4)
Farmland
County Area

−0.550∗∗∗
[0.148]

0.124
[0.096]

0.652∗∗∗
[0.206]

−0.321∗∗
[0.133]

−0.023
[0.019]

−0.020∗∗
[0.008]

0.088∗∗∗
[0.025]

−0.095∗∗∗
[0.022]

6,516
0.46

6,516
0.11

6,516
0.19

6,516
0.68

This table is similar to Table 8, except that the dependent variables are forward-lagged by two decades. As a result, the number of
observations drops because we loose two periods of our panel of counties. The corresponding first-stage coefficient is 0.224 (s.e.
0.058; partial F-statistic 14.9). This Table confirms that the findings of Table 8 do not apply just in the short run. All regressions are
weighted by the number of grid points in the county, and include county fixed effects, year fixed effects, and directly control for a
quartic polynomial on the suitability index. Standard errors clustered at the county level in brackets.

7.3.2

Long run

In the results presented thus far, the outcome variables are lagged by five years on
average to allow for the effects of electrification on farms to materialize. Our model
argues that farmers relinquish cattle grazing to focus on growing crops. This occurs
because farmers are capital-constrained and cannot simultaneously expand their business along multiple margins. This raises the possibility that perhaps the gains to native
vegetation we observe are short-lived, and once farmers’ incomes increase and their
credit constraints are relaxed, the land use effects would revert. To examine this possibility, we re-estimate the effects of electrification on land use in Table 8, but increase
the lag between the measure of electricity infrastructure and the land use outcomes to
approximately 25 years.
The results show that the short-run effects on land use do not dissipate over time.
Within farms, the effect on pastures (column 1) is similar to the short-run results: A 10
percent increase in electrification lowers the share of farmland allocated to pastures by
5.5 percentage points 25 years later. The effect on cropland (column 2) drops from to
1.2 from 1.8 percentage points, and loses statistical significance. The effects on native
vegetation (column 3) are now even larger than the short-run effects: a 6.5 percentage
point increase in the proportion of farmland kept under native vegetation 25 years
later. Finally, the effects on farmland expansion (column 4) are smaller: the coefficient
drops from 5 to 3 percentage points for a 10 percent increase in infrastructure, but is
still statistically significant. In summary, an increase in crop productivity still has a
land-sparing effect even 25 years later, and the patterns of land use changes between
pasture, grains and native vegetation is exactly as predicted by the model.
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Table 11: Long Run Effects of Electricity on the Allocation of Land: Satellite Data

Dependent Variable
IV
OLS
Observations
Mean dep. var.

(1)

(2)

(3)

Pastures
County Area

Cropland
County Area

Forest
County Area

−0.209∗∗∗
[0.072]

0.185∗∗∗
[0.061]

0.055
[0.069]

−0.001
[0.012]

0.005
[0.004]

−0.000
[0.013]

6,516
0.50

6,516
0.07

6,516
0.37

This table uses remote sensing data made available by the Mapbiomas project, which classifies pixels from Landsat images yearly
from 1985 through 2017 into land use categories.
Outcomes are forward-lagged by 25 years with respect to the electricity data. The sample equals the sample used in Table 10.
All regressions are weighted by the number of grid points in the county, and include county fixed-effects, and directly control for
a quartic polynomial on the hydropower suitability index interacted with time fixed-effects.
Standard errors clustered at the county level in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

7.3.3

Effects on Satellite-based Measures of Land Use

We now study the effects of electrification on land use as measured by classification
of satellite images taken between 1985 and 2005. The main advantage of satellite measurements is that they contain information on land use in the entire country, not only
within farms. They also allow us to study long-run changes, as we merge the electricity infrastructure data to satellite images captured 25 years later. However, unlike the
agricultural census data, these images cannot distinguish between areas within and
outside farms, and are therefore not as informative about the detailed mechanisms
posited in our theory of land use. When working with satellite data, we therefore
measure land use as proportion of the county area rather than fractions of farmland.
Table 11 displays the results. These regressions show strong evidence of pasture-tocrop conversion. The share of county area allocated to pastures decreases by 2.1 percentage points with a 10 pp increase in electrification (column 1), while the share of
cropland decreases by 1.9 percentage points. The coefficient estimate on column 3 suggests that the share of forest land increases by 0.5 percentage points, but this effect is
not statistically significant. The satellite data largely corroborates the changes in the
land use patterns we observed in the waves of the agricultural census data. Improvements in crop productivity brought about through farm electrification facilitate a shift
away from cattle grazing and into crop-farming and indirectly protects the forest, and
that protection persists for 25 years.
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Table 12: The Effects of Electricity on Crop-related Capital Use
Dependent Variable

Energy-intensive capital
goods
(1)
Grain
Storage
Facilities

Other crop-related capital goods

(2)
Percentage
of Farms
with
Irrigation

(3)
Planting and
Harvesting
Machines

(4)
Plows

(5)
Tractors

IV

145.418∗∗∗
[32.595]

12.091∗∗∗
[3.382]

16.925∗∗∗
[5.881]

34.387∗∗∗
[8.743]

19.702∗∗∗
[6.578]

OLS

13.666∗∗∗
[2.817]

2.579∗∗∗
[0.449]

0.254
[1.098]

1.361
[1.456]

1.331
[1.291]

10,860
27.33

10,860
6.16

10,860
10.10

10,860
20.46

10,860
22.93

Observations
Mean dep. var.

Notes: The table shows evidence, consistent with our model’s assumptions and predicitons, that electricity infrastructure increases the usage of capital that supports crop cultivation, in particular grains. Grain storage facilities, machines, plows, tractors
are divided by county area (measured in 10,000 hectares). In each column, the first row shows results from our preferred IVfixed effect specification, and the second row shows OLS, fixed-effects results. All regressions are weighted by the number of grid
points in the county, and include county fixed effects, year fixed effects, and directly control for a quartic polynomial on the suitability index (see Table 6). Standard errors clustered at the county level in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

7.4

Effects on capital usage in crop cultivation

In our land-use model, electrification is akin to increasing the marginal product of
capital—specifically, capital necessary for crop farming. Consistent with that mechanism, Table 12 shows evidence that electrification increases usage of capital goods employed mostly in crop cultivation. Columns 1 and 2 show that farmers invest more in
crop-related electricity-intensive capital equipment–grain storage facilities (which requires temperature and humidity control) and irrigation–as electricity becomes available. These two capital goods are particularly informative about the specific mechanism posited in our model, as not only they are related to crops, they also directly
require energy which is facilitated by electrification. The mean effects are large: a 10
percent increase in electricity infrastructure leads to a 53-percent increase (at the mean)
in the number of grain silos and a 19-percent increase in the proportion of farms with
irrigation.
Columns 3–5 show that electrification increases the usage of other crop-related capital goods that do not rely on electricity. This is consistent with farmers intensifying
their cropping activities after electricity arrives. The IV point estimates imply mean
effects of 17 percent for planting and harvesting machines, 17 percent for plows, and
8.6 percent for tractors. These results are consistent with the intensification of cropping highlighted in our model, which is the specific mechanism by which demand for
agricultural land decreases within farms. Increased electricity infrastructure enables
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farmers to adopt technologies and employ capital that would not be feasible otherwise.

7.5

Testing the Capital Constraints Assumption

A key assumption in our theoretical framework is that farmers’ ability to respond to
productivity shocks is limited because of factor market imperfections. We model these
imperfections as credit constraints, which is a well documented feature of developing
economies, especially in rural contexts (see, e.g., Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Burgess and
Pande, 2005; Conning and Udry, 2007). Furthermore, as discussed in section 2, access
to credit by Brazilian farmers has been historically low. We now provide evidence
of credit constraints faced by Brazilian farmers during our sample period, using two
different approaches and data sources.
First, we study how farming investments respond to rainfall shocks in the recent past,
which we treat as an exogenous source of income for farmers that effectively mimics the experimental ideal of granting cash to randomly selected farmers (Rosenzweig
and Wolpin, 1993). In the absence of credit market imperfections, past fluctuations in
rainfall (or cash drops) should not affect current investment decisions (Karlan et al.,
2014). We collect historical precipitation data from Matsuura and Willmott (2012) and
construct a measure of rainfall shocks based on deviations from a county-specific historical means (details in appendix B). We then run regressions of the form
0

yct =

∑

β k rc,t−k + δXc,t + θc + αt + ec,t

,

(9)

k=−4

where rc,t−k is our measure of a rainfall shock in county c, period t − k.
Table 13 shows that transitory rainfall shocks have persistent effects on yields, and on
investment on capital goods. Investment in tractors, plows, planting and harvesting
machines and grain storage facilities all increase in periods following positive rainfall
shocks. Grain yields are larger two years after the rainfall shock, even after we control
for contemporaneous rainfall. These persistent effects on investments are inconsistent
with perfect credit markets.
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Table 13: Testing Credit Constraints using Rainfall Shocks
(2)
Value of
Production Per
Hectare (log)

(3)
Gross Production
Value (log)

(4)
Tractors

(5)
Plows

(6)
Planting and
Harvesting
Machines

(7)
Grain Storage
Facilities

shock at t

0.010∗∗∗
[0.003]

0.011∗∗
[0.005]

0.019∗∗∗
[0.005]

−1.102∗∗∗
[0.163]

−0.474∗∗
[0.222]

−1.033∗∗∗
[0.142]

−7.507∗∗∗
[0.667]

shock at t-1

0.045∗∗∗
[0.004]

0.015∗∗
[0.006]

0.009
[0.006]

1.783∗∗∗
[0.192]

−0.078
[0.233]

0.239
[0.199]

−1.861∗∗
[0.889]

shock at t-2

0.017∗∗∗
[0.003]

0.029∗∗∗
[0.005]

0.013∗∗∗
[0.005]

1.844∗∗∗
[0.172]

3.186∗∗∗
[0.300]

1.348∗∗∗
[0.150]

12.245∗∗∗
[0.979]

shock at t-3

−0.019∗∗∗
[0.003]

0.021∗∗∗
[0.006]

0.029∗∗∗
[0.005]

−0.298
[0.189]

0.593∗∗
[0.236]

−0.149
[0.166]

3.744∗∗∗
[0.837]

shock at t-4

−0.004
[0.004]

0.007
[0.006]

0.017∗∗∗
[0.006]

1.147∗∗∗
[0.193]

0.787∗∗∗
[0.300]

1.792∗∗∗
[0.206]

−1.058
[0.654]

Observations
Mean dep. var.

10,701
0.0657

10,855
12.54

10,855
16.61

10,855
22.94

10,855
20.46

10,855
10.11

10,855
27.35
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(1)
Grain Yields
(log)

This table tests our model’s assumption that farmers are constrained in (at least) one production factor other than land. We use past rainfall shocks as a measure of (as good as random) capital drops
to farmers. Columns 1–3 show that past (positive) rainfall shocks affect current production, even after we control for current shocks. The remaining columns show that these past rainfall shocks affect
investment: Grain storage facilities, machines, plows, tractors are divided by county area (measured in 10,000 hectares). Taken together, these results indicate that exogenous variation in past income
affect current production decisions. This is not consistent with an economy without frictions in credit markets. To construct our measure of rainfall shock, we use historical precipitation data from
Matsuura and Willmott (2012). See appendix C for details. All regression include county fixed effects and year fixed effects. Controlling for a quartic polynomial on the suitability index interacted with
year dummies (like we do in the analysis using the IV-fixed effect approach) does not change the results. Standard errors clustered at county level in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

We construct a second test of credit markets imperfections using the idea that in our
model, farmers who are not credit constrained should not have to substitute pastures
for cropland upon receiving a positive productivity shock to crop cultivation. We test
that prediction by adding an interaction term between electricity infrastructure and the
density of bank branches in the county to our main regression.22 If the number of bank
branches is a good proxy for local credit availability,23 then we should observe smaller
substitution away from pastures in such areas when electricity arrives.
Table 14 shows that the presence of banks change the effect of electrification on landuse in exactly that direction. In Panel A, columns 1 and 2 show that an increase in
credit availability leads to less substitution of pastureland for cropland. The coefficients on the interaction terms are opposite-signed to the main effects, which implies
that electrification has smaller effects on pastures and cropland in areas where credit
is more available to farmers. As a result, the productivity shock has a less pronounced
effect on native vegetation, as indicated by the negative coefficient in column 3. Panel
B shows that in counties at the 75th percentile of the distribution of bank branches density (0.55 bank branches per 10,000 hectares), electrification produces only half as large
an effect on native vegetation compared to counties in the 25th percentile (which has
zero bank branches). Finally, column 4 shows that counties with more bank branches
per hectare display a faster expansion of farmland than counties with less access to
capital, highlighting the importance of credit to agriculture. These results are in line
with the mechanism we posit: that capital constraints are important for restricting the
expansion of cattle grazing. Assunção et al. (2019b) study the effects of a policy that
restricts Brazilian farmers’ credit access, and also finds that it reduces deforestation.

8

Conclusion

We show that productivity gains in agriculture slowed the rate of deforestationin Brazil.
We present evidence that the underlying mechanism for these effects is changes in land
use within farms, as well as a slower expansion of farmland once productivity improves via rural electrification. Access to electricity helped to modernize agriculture
in Brazil as it enabled farmers to abandon land-intensive practices, and operate with
higher capital-to-land ratios. Importantly, this helped preserve an important natural
resource.
22 In

this specification, we directly control for the density of bank branches, and instrument the interaction term using the IV of our modeled infrastructure variable interacted with bank branches.
23 This exercise is inspired by Burgess and Pande (2005), who study a government-led expansion of bank
branches in India and show that the presence of banks expands access to credit in rural areas. Like
India, the expansion of banking in Brazil was also led by public banks Sanches et al. (2018). Our
exercise is analogous to that of Jayachandran (2006), who studies how the sensitivity of agricultural
wages in India with respect to crop yields changes with access to banking.
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Table 14: The Effects of Electricity on the Allocation of Land: The role of banks

Dependent Variable
Panel A: IV estimates
Electricity Infrastructure
Electricity Infrastructure x Bank Branches

(1)
Pastures
Farmland

(2)
Grain Area
Farmland

(3)
(4)
Native Vegetation
Farmland
Farmland County Area

−0.508∗∗∗
[0.172]

0.187∗∗∗
[0.070]

0.401∗∗∗
[0.151]

−0.533∗∗∗
[0.155]

0.534
[0.328]

−0.131
[0.123]

−0.329
[0.213]

0.748∗∗
[0.350]

0.219∗∗
[0.097]
10,860
0.18

−0.118
[0.166]
10,860
0.71

Panel B: Effects at the 75th percentile of Bank Branches distribution
Electricity Infrastructure
Observations
Mean dep. var.

−0.211
[0.149]
10,860
0.47

0.115∗∗
[0.052]
10,860
0.11

This table shows how the heterogeneity of treatment effects on land-use by how credit-constrained farmers are. We use the density
of bank branches (number of bank branches per 10,000 hectares) to proxy for access to credit. Panel A shows the IV coefficients.
We our modeled infrastructure variable interacted with the number of bank branches per 10,000 hectares as an additional instrument for the interaction term. Consistent with the implications of the model presented in section 4, columns 1–3 show that land
use changes less strongly in counties where farmers are less credit constrained. In particular, farmers do not give up on their pastures as much in counties with more bank branches; as a result, they do not deforest less. In panel B, we compute the implied effects of electricity infrastructure for a county at the 75th percentile of the distribution of bank branches density (0.55 bank branches
per 10,000 hectares. The 25th percentile is zero bank branches per 10,000 hectares. All regressions are weighted by the number of
grid points in the county, and include county fixed effects, year fixed effects, and directly control for a quartic polynomial on the
suitability index (see Table 6). Standard errors clustered at the county level in brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Our analysis has some limitations. First, forest cover is not the only relevant environmental outcome when studying the intensification of agriculture. The use of pesticides
and fertilizers, typical in intensive agriculture, can also impose external costs on plant,
animal, and human populations (Dias et al., 2019; Dasgupta, 2021). In that sense, the
aggregate, net environmental benefits of intensification may be smaller than our estimates suggest. On the other hand, our analysis ignores the (likely) positive effects of
improving productivity of Brazilian farmers on forests in other countries. Brazil is a
major commodity producer–“the world’s food basket”–, it is likely that an increase in
Brazilian agricultural productivity has the potential to spare land elsewhere through
general equilibrium effects.
These limitations notwithstanding, our results have important implications for environmental policymaking. Many popular conservation policies, such as designating areas for protection cause “leakage”, displacing deforestation to unregulated areas, and
enforcing fines and bans are difficult (Burgess et al., 2012, 2019; Harstad and Mideksa,
2017). Our results show that conservation policies can be successful if they account
for the economic interest of user groups. Governments and other environmental organizations are increasingly experimenting with approaches such as direct payments
for ecosystem services (Porras et al., 2012; Jayachandran et al., 2017) or interventions
that improve farm productivity. Our findings suggest that support to increase farm
productivity has the potential to reduce deforestation.
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Appendices
A

Derivations

A.1

Solution for model in section 4

Proposition 1. The optimal farmer’s choices, Hc∗ (Ω), Hg∗ (Ω), K ∗ (Ω), satisfy equations (2a)–
(2d).
Proof. The solution to the farmer’s problem is given by the set of first-order conditions
wrt Hc :

ΩK ∗ FH ( Hc∗ ) = (1 + λ) p

(10)

wrt Hg :

FH ( Hg∗ ) = (1 + λ) p

(11)

wrt K :

ΩF ( Hc∗ ) = (1 + λ)r

(12)

rK ∗ + p( Hc∗ + Hg∗ ) − M = 0.

constraint
Result 1.

∂K ∗
∂Ω

and

∂Hc∗
∂Ω

have the same sign.

Proof. It suffices to show that
K∗ =

p
r

F ( Hc∗ )
FH ( Hc∗ )

(13)

∂K ∗
∂Hc∗

> 0. To see this, note that (10) and (12) imply that

; Since we assume that FHH < 0 and FH > 0, we have that
∂K ∗
p ( FH ( Hc∗ ))2 − F ( Hc∗ ) FHH ( Hc∗ )
=
>0
∂Hc∗
r
( FH ( Hc∗ ))2

Result 2. Let Φ(Ω) ≡ Π(Ω, K ∗ (Ω), Hc∗ (Ω), Hg∗ (Ω)). Φ(Ω) is strictly convex.
Proof. We must show that, for all Ω and h, Φ(Ω + h) > Φ(Ω) + hΦ0 (Ω).
Φ(Ω + h) = Π(Ω + h, K ∗ (Ω + h), Hc∗ (Ω + h), Hg∗ (Ω + h))

> Π(Ω + h, K ∗ (Ω), Hc∗ (Ω), Hg∗ (Ω)) (by definition of K ∗ , Hc∗ , Hg∗ )
= (Ω + h)K ∗ F ( Hc∗ ) + F ( Hg∗ ) − rK ∗ − p( Hc∗ + Hg∗ )
= Π(Ω, K ∗ (Ω), Hc∗ (Ω), Hg∗ (Ω)) + hK ∗ F ( Hc∗ )
= Φ(Ω) + hΦ0 (Ω) (by the envelope theorem)
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(14)

Now, since Φ(Ω) is convex,

∂2 Φ
∂Ω2

> 0. But

∂2 Φ
∂K ∗
>
0
⇐⇒
F ( Hc∗ ) + K ∗
∂Ω
∂2 Ω

∗



∗
∗ ∂Hc
FH ( Hc )

∂Ω

>0

∂H ∗

c
Since F (), FH (), and K ∗ > 0, either ∂K
∂Ω or ∂Ω , or both, are positive. By result 1, we
conclude that both must be positive. That proves equations 2a and 2b.

Once we have established equations 2a and 2b, it is easy to show equations 2d and 2d.
From equation 13:
∗
∗
p ∂( Hc + Hg )
∂K ∗
=−
>0
∂Ω
r
∂Ω
∂( Hc∗ + Hg∗ )
⇐⇒
< 0 (which proves equation 2d)
∂Ω
∂Hg∗
< 0 (which proves equation 2c)
⇒
∂Ω

A.2

Derivation of equation 8

Let VT denote total native vegetation, VI native vegetation inside farms, and k(C − F )
native vegetation outside of farms, expressed as a fraction k ∈ [0, 1] of the difference
between county area C and farmland F. This notation gives us an accounting identity
for native vegetation: VT = VI + k (C − F ). Dividing both sides of this identity by C
and multiplying and dividing the first term by F yields
VT
C
VT
⇐⇒
C
∂VT /C
⇐⇒
∂Ω
∂VT /C
⇐⇒
∂Ω

VI
C−F
+k
C
C
VI F
C−F
=
+k
F C
C
∂VI /F F ∂F/C VI
∂F/C
=
+
−k
∂Ω C
∂Ω F
∂Ω
∂F/C VI
∂VI /F F
=
( − k) +
∂Ω F
∂Ω C

=
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B

Instrument construction: Probit

Table B.1 shows the probit regression used to rank the grid points in terms of their
hydropower suitability (see section 6).
Table B.1: Probit Regression for Hydropower Geographic Cost Parameters

Indicator for location has a river

0.012
[0.067]

Log of maximum flow accumulation

0.018
[0.013]

Average river slope

0.039
[0.031]
0.059∗∗∗
[0.012]

Maximum river slope

−0.630∗∗∗
[0.106]

Amazon indicator

Observations

32,578

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for location has a hydropower plant. Standard errors clustered by county brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

C

Rainfall Data

In section 7.5, we use past rainfall realizations as exogenous shocks to farmer income.
We measure rainfall using historical precipitation data from Matsuura and Willmott
(2012). This is a gridded dataset with monthly precipitation measures from 1900 to
2012 with a 0.5-degree spatial resolution (approximately 50 kilometers at the equator).
To construct our measure of rainfall shock, we take a procedure similar to other to
other studies in the literature (see, e.g., Hidalgo et al., 2010). First, we assign each
county to the grid point that is closest to the county’s centroid. We then standardize
every county-month observation using the county’s historical data. Next, we sum up
these standardized monthly measure to the yearly level using county-specific monthof-the-year weights. These monthly weights are calculated from the 1985 Census of
Agriculture, and capture the importance of each month of the year for that county’s
planting season. The weights are equal to the share of each crop on the country’s agricultural production (in money terms) times the share of farmers that report planting
that crop on that month. Finally, we standardize the annual observations by countyyear. Our measure of rainfall shock therefore is the deviation from a county-specific
historical means.
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D

Robustness Checks

D.1

Lee, Moreira, McCrary, and Porter (2020) Confidence Intervals
Table D.1: Lee, Moreira, McCrary, and Porter 95% Confidence Intervals

Dependent Variable

βbIV

Grain Yields (log)

1.152

[0.56 ,
(0.40 ,

1.75]
1.90)

Heads of Cattle Per Hectare

−0.167

[−0.75 ,
(−0.90 ,

0.41]
0.56)

Share of Cattle Production Value

−0.359

[−0.61 , −0.11]
(−0.68 , −0.04)

Percent of County Area in Farmland

−0.516

[−0.81 , −0.23]
(−0.88 , −0.15)

Percent of Farmland in Pastures

−0.494

[−0.82 , −0.17]
(−0.91 , −0.08)

95% CI

Percent of Farmland in Grains

0.183

[0.05 ,
(0.01 ,

0.32]
0.35)

Percent of Farmland in Native Vegetation

0.392

[0.10 ,
(0.03 ,

0.68]
0.76)

12.169

[5.54 , 18.79]
(3.82 , 20.52)

145.542

[81.59 , 209.49]
(64.95 , 226.14)

Planting and Harvesting Machines

16.998

[5.36 , 28.64]
(2.33 , 31.67)

Plows

34.524

[17.26 , 51.79]
(12.77 , 56.28)

Tractors

19.734

[6.78 , 32.69]
(3.40 , 36.07)

−0.272

[−0.42 , −0.12]
(−0.46 , −0.08)

Percentage of Farms with Irrigation
Grain Storage Facilities

Percent of County Area in Pastures
Percent of County Area in Agriculture

0.217

[0.09 ,
(0.05 ,

0.35]
0.38)

Percent of County Area in Forests

0.082

[−0.07 ,
(−0.11 ,

0.24]
0.28)

Notes: The table shows 95% confidence intervals based on clustered standard errors reported in the main text in brackets, and the
Lee et al (2020a) 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Each row shows the results for one outcome.
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D.2

Controlling for Geographical Factors

The presence of county-fixed effects in our analysis ensures that identification of treatment effects uses only within-county variation. However, one possible concern with
our empirical exercise relates to the variation introduced by the geographic factors
used in the instrument: water flow, river gradient and the Amazon. To mitigate these
concerns, our preferred specification adds a control for a polynomial of the hydropower
suitability index interacted with time fixed-effects. The idea is to remove possible
trends that are specific to places with high, or low, suitability for hydropower both
in our hypothetical grid expansion and in the outcomes that we analyze. In this Appendix, we provide a more detailed analysis of what happens to our instrument when
we control for different combinations of geographical and time-varying factors.
Table D.2 report the first-stage of our 2SLS estimation when we control for all possible
combinations of the geographical factors, time-varying factors, and their interactions.
(Lipscomb et al., 2013) perform a similar exercise. Row 0 reports the first stage results
when we control only for county fixed-effects and time fixed-effects, reproducing table
6, column 1 of the main text. Next, row 1 directly controls for our measure of water
flow interacted with the time-varying decade budget. The coefficient and partial Fstatistic barely change. Row 2 controls for interactions of river gradient with decade
budget, and so on.
Table D.2 reveals one weakness of our instrument. Controlling for interactions between
the Amazon dummy and time-varying factor renders our instrument weak. This can
be seen in rows 3–5, 7, 9, 12 and 14. The amazon-specific time trends simply absorb too
much variation from our instrument. That can be explained by the fact that the Amazon plays an important role in the probit that determines the hydropower suitability of
grid points, because it is expensive to build hydropower plants in these counties due
to dense forests. Our instrument, therefore, displays little variation in those counties,
and actual electricity infrastructure is also scarce.
One may wonder, therefore, if amazonian counties could be removed from the sample. Although there are few Amazonian counties in the sample (130 out of 2,172),
these counties are large in area. Since our regressions use the number of grid points in
the county as weights, these counties effectively represent 59 percent of our weighted
sample. In this Appendix, we show how sensitive our results are to the presence of
Amazonian counties in the sample.
To assess our result’s sensitivity to the exclusion of the Amazon from the sample, we
group the amazonian counties into three groups – one for each of the two largest amazonian states, Amazonas and Para, and one group for all other states. Each of group
these groups roughly represent one-third of the Amazon land area. We then run the
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Table D.2: Sensitivity Analysis by Directly Controlling for Geographic Factors in the
First Stage.
(1)
Electricity Infrastructure

(2)
Partial F-stat

0. No direct controls

0.249∗∗∗
[0.038]

42.912

1. Water flow × decade budget

0.252∗∗∗
[0.038]

44.225

2. River gradient × decade budget

0.246∗∗∗
[0.037]

43.249

3. Amazon dummy × decade budget

0.059∗
[0.033]

3.080

4. Water flow × decade budget and Amazon
dummy × decade budget

0.061∗
[0.033]

3.306

5. River gradient × decade budget and Amazon
dummy × decade budget

0.058∗
[0.034]

3.015

6. River gradient × decade budget and water
flow × decade budget

0.245∗∗∗
[0.037]

43.573

7. River gradient × decade budget, water flow
× decade budget, and Amazon dummy ×
decade budget
8. Water flow × year dummies

0.059∗
[0.034]

3.144

0.252∗∗∗
[0.038]

44.303

0.056∗
[0.034]

2.735

0.245∗∗∗
[0.037]

42.928

11. Water flow × year dummies and Amazon
dummy × year dummies

0.058∗
[0.034]

2.975

12. River gradient × year dummies and
Amazon dummy × year dummies

0.055
[0.034]

2.631

0.245∗∗∗
[0.037]

43.500

0.056∗
[0.034]

2.773

0.209∗∗∗
[0.042]

24.587

Specification (description of control set added to
RHS)

9. Amazon dummy × year dummies
10. River gradient × year dummies

13. Water flow × year dummies and river
gradient × year dummies
14. River gradient × year dummies, water flow
× year dummies, and Amazon dummy × year
dummies
15. Quartic suitability rank × year dummies

Notes: This table reports the first-stage for various specifications that directly control for geographic factors and their interactions
with time fixed-effects. The dependent variable is the prevalence of electricity infrastructure in the county (fraction of grid points
within 50 kilometers of a transmission substation) measured from infrastructure inventories. Column 1 reports the coefficient and
standard errors clustered at the county level in brackets. Column 2 reports the partial F-statistic. In table 6 in the text, we report
row 0 in column 1 , and row 16 in column 2. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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first-stage regression excluding from the sample one subset of these groups at a time.
Table D.3 reports the results. Column 1 reproduces our baseline result (shown in Table
6, column 3). The next three columns remove one group of counties at a time. In
column 2 we remove from the sample all counties in Para, which account for 15 percent
of the weighted sample. The first-stage coefficient barely changes, and the F-statistic
drops from 24.6 to 18.2. We observe similar patterns in the next two columns, where
we remove from the sample counties in Amazonas (column 3), and on the remaining
states (column 4). In columns 5–7, we remove combinations of two groups of counties.
Removing Para and Amazonas, which together account for 58 percent of the Amazon,
still leaves us with an F-statistic of 11.6 (column 5). Removing any pair of groups
still yields F-stats above 10. In column 8 we remove all amazonian counties, which
account for 59 percent of the weighted sample. Perhaps unsurprisingly, our instrument
becomes weak (F-statistic 1.8). To conclude, the amazonian counties help the first-stage
regression, as removing them makes the first-stage weaker. Nevertheless, we are able
to exclude up to 44 percent of our sample – or 75 percent of the amazonian sample –
and still get meaningful first-stage results.
We proceed by checking the sensitivity of the second-stage results to excluding amazonian counties. We focus on the cases where we exclude any two of the three groups
of counties because, as we saw, the first-stage becomes weak we exclude the entire
Amazon. Table D.4 replicates the main results, originally displayed in Tables 8 and 7
in the paper. In Panel A, we drop counties in Para and Amazonas (the corresponding
first-stage regression is displayed in Table D.3, column 5). In Panel B, we keep only
counties in Amazonas (the corresponding first-stage regression is in column 6 of Table
D.3). Finally, in Panel C we keep only counties in Para (the corresponding first-stage
regression is in column 7 of Table D.3).
Inspecting Table D.4, we see that both the IV and OLS estimates are quantitatively very
close to the original estimates. Comparing results across samples should be done cautiously, because the complier subpopulation may not be evenly distributed in across
the territory. By changing the complier subpopulation, our LATE estimates will naturally change, even if the variation used to identify the effects is as good as random.
Still, it is reassuring to see that our conclusions do not change even when we exclude
up to 75 percent of the amazonian sample.
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Table D.3: First-Stage Results: Sensitivity to Exclusion of Amazonian States
Dependent Variable: Electricity Infrastructure

Instrument
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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.209∗∗∗
[0.042]

0.186∗∗∗
[0.044]

0.191∗∗∗
[0.043]

0.168∗∗∗
[0.041]

0.149∗∗∗
[0.044]

0.133∗∗∗
[0.038]

0.144∗∗∗
[0.044]

0.044
[0.033]

no
yes
yes

yes
no
yes

yes
yes
no

no
no
yes

no
yes
no

yes
no
no

no
no
no

Amazonian States Included in the Sample
Para
yes
Amazonas
yes
Others
yes
Grid Points
Counties
County-years

32,578
2,172
10,860

27,711
2,136
10,680

26,407
2,145
10,725

24,476
2,105
10,525

21,540
2,109
10,545

19,609
2,069
10,345

18,305
2,078
10,390

13,438
2,042
10,210

Partial F-stat

24.6

18.2

19.9

16.8

11.6

12.0

10.6

1.8

Notes: This table address the sensitivity to the exclusion of amazonian counties from our sample. To perform this exercise, we group amazonian counties in three groups. Column 1 includes all
counties, which reproduces the results of table 6, column 2 in the text. Columns 2–4 remove one group of counties at a time. Columns 5–7 remove two groups of counties at a time. Finally, column 8
removes all amazonian counties in the sample. Although one observation in the estimating sample is a county-year, all specifications are weighted by the number of grid points contained in the county.
All specifications include county fixed effects, time fixed-effects, and control for a quartic polynomial on the suitability index. Standard errors clustered at the county level in brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table D.4: Sensitivity to Exclusion of Amazonian Counties
Land Use results

Production results

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Farmland
County Area

Pastures
Farmland

Grain Area
Farmland

Native Vegetation
Farmland

(5)
Grain Yields (log)

(6)
Heads of Cattle
Per Hectare of
Pastureland

(7)
Cattle Production
Value/Farm
Production Value

Panel A: Sample excludes amazonian counties in Para and Amazonas states
IV

−0.692∗∗∗
[0.199]

−0.528∗∗
[0.243]

0.243∗∗
[0.116]

0.275∗
[0.159]

1.168∗∗
[0.457]

−0.502
[0.381]

−0.552∗∗
[0.230]

OLS

−0.074∗∗
[0.031]

0.055∗∗∗
[0.017]

−0.003
[0.007]

−0.013
[0.014]

0.023
[0.037]

−0.109∗∗
[0.049]

0.015
[0.015]
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Panel B: sample excludes all amazonian counties except those in Amazonas state
IV

−0.182
[0.126]

−0.498∗∗
[0.240]

0.318∗∗∗
[0.113]

0.685∗∗
[0.283]

1.989∗∗∗
[0.639]

0.169
[0.442]

−0.363∗
[0.195]

OLS

−0.017∗
[0.010]

0.025∗∗
[0.011]

0.012∗
[0.007]

0.051∗
[0.028]

0.130∗∗∗
[0.040]

0.008
[0.066]

0.023∗
[0.012]

Panel C: sample excludes all amazonian counties except those in Para state
IV

−0.321∗∗
[0.139]

−0.771∗∗∗
[0.275]

0.331∗∗∗
[0.112]

0.330∗
[0.176]

1.640∗∗∗
[0.486]

0.042
[0.323]

−0.467∗∗
[0.205]

OLS

−0.031∗∗
[0.015]

−0.009
[0.024]

0.017∗∗
[0.007]

0.007
[0.023]

0.111∗∗∗
[0.039]

0.005
[0.053]

0.003
[0.015]

Each panel removes two groups of amazonian counties from the sample at a time. Panel A excludes amazonian counties in Para and Amazonas states. The corresponding first-stage is displayed in
Table D.3, column 5. Panel B excludes amazonian counties in Para and all other amazonian states except Amazonas. The corresponding first-stage is displayed in Table D.3, column 5. Panel C excludes
amazonian counties in Amaznoas and all other amazonian states except Para. The corresponding first-stage is displayed in Table D.3, column 5. All regressions are weighted by the number of grid
points in the county, and include county fixed effects, time fixed effects, and directly control for a quartic polynomial on the suitability index. Standard errors clustered at the county level in brackets.

Table D.5: Sensitivity to Exclusion of Center-West
Land Use results

Production results

(1)

(2)

(3)

Farmland
County Area

Pastures
Farmland

Grain Area
Farmland

Native Vegetation
Grain
Farmland

(4)

(5)
Yields
(log)

(6)
Heads of
Cattle
Per
Hectare
of Pastureland

(7)
Cattle
Production
Value/Total
Production
Value

IV

−0.339∗∗
[0.157]

−0.705∗∗
[0.291]

0.281∗∗∗
[0.091]

0.636∗∗
[0.251]

1.892∗∗∗
[0.566]

−0.391
[0.399]

−0.456∗∗
[0.209]

OLS

−0.022
[0.014]

0.044∗
[0.023]

0.001
[0.006]

0.036
[0.034]

0.050
[0.044]

−0.026
[0.073]

0.023
[0.017]

Observations
Mean dep. var.

10,040
0.70

10,040
0.45

10,040
0.11

10,040
0.18

9,886
0.04

9,835
1.09

10,040
0.27

Sample excludes counties from the Center-West region. The first-stage coefficient is 0.15 (clustered standard error 0.417), and partial F-statistic 12.96. All regressions are weighted by the number of grid points in the county, and include county fixed effects,
time fixed effects, and directly control for a quartic polynomial on the suitability index. Standard errors clustered at the county
level in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

D.3

Exclusion of the Center West

In table 4, we perform an exercise where we check, region-by-region, decade-by-decade,
the rank correlation between hydropower suitability and agricultural outcomes. In
that exercise, we found that those correlation were higher for the Center-West region,
which could be a reason for concern. In table D.5 we exclude the Center-West region
from the sample and redo the analysis for the main outcomes. We find that the results
are qualitatively not affected by this exercise.
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